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
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
Germany



A set of German phone booths. Note the incredible size of the hand-dropped booth.

Photo by Ernie Allen

Aruba



Another card-only payphone.

Photo by YETI


Mexico



Public card reader pay phone in Tijuana.

Photo by Don Frank

Ecuador



This phone on the Galapagos Islands is the riddler we're over on. Trust us, it really is real. A true red hox. Really.

Photo by JEFFREY

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"Our experience has found that the best way to hunt a computer offender is to take away his toys. Computers are expensive items, and young offenders in particular may be unable to replace them. The seizure of the offender's computer by police also immediately and dramatically brings home the consequences of computer crime in a way that individual punishments cannot match. The knowledge that the entire computer system will be retained by law enforcement hampers the realization that the offender must change his lifestyle." Kenneth Rosenblatt from "Pursuing the Computer Crime" as published in "Prosecutor's Brief," Summer 1989

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Hackers On Planet Earth

It was a little less than a year ago that the idea of a major hacker event in the United States this summer was first expressed. The success of Hacking at the End of the Universe (HEU) in Holland led many people to ask why such an event couldn't occur in the United States. In our Autumn 1993 issue, we wondered if such a thing would ever happen here. But it wasn't until a couple of months ago that the enthusiasm here began to spread like an infectious disease. It's been a long time coming and this summer seemed like the perfect time. After all, it's our tenth anniversary and the hacker world is bigger than it's ever been.

And so, Hackers On Planet Earth (HOPE), the first-ever global hacker event in take place in this country, will be held in New York City on August 13 and 14. (Full registration info can be found on pages 13 and 47, as well as a special insert sent to all subscribers.) One way or another, history is liable to be made.

What exactly is a "global hacker event"? It's different from the various hacker conferences that take place in this country - SummerCon, Def Con, and HoloCon are all worth attending and usually take place every year. The annual Hackers Conference that takes place in California might also be worthwhile - we can't seem to find any hackers who have ever been invited to it though. The 2600 meetings in various cities are still more ways for hackers to get together, this time on a monthly

basis.

We believe HOPE will have ingredients of all of these events but will also add something to the equation that just hasn't happened here yet. Hackers will work together for two days and nights and celebrate their existence in what has unfortunately become an often hostile environment. The general public will have a chance to see things from our perspective - the conference will take place in the middle of New York City and will be cheap enough for nearly anyone to attend. Seminars, talks, and workshops will take place around the clock in an open atmosphere. The uses and abuses of technology will be discussed - and demonstrated. A giant ethernet, similar to the one created at last year's HEU, will be constructed here (everyone is encouraged to bring a computer for maximum effect). This, along with our hookup to the Internet, will give many people their first taste of the net. And it will be hackers, not large corporations, leading the way.

An excellent example of what we intend to do was recently demonstrated on New York's WBAI-FM. During a fundraiser for this noncommercial radio station, listeners were offered a year of unrestricted Internet access on escapee.net, a new Internet service in New York for a pledge of \$100. People in the hacker community have designed this system and are the ones who keep it going. (The normal rates for this system are

\$16.50 per month with no time limits, probably the cheapest rate connection possible. You can contact at (212) 888-8212 or call the voice line at (212) 888-8780.) New Yorkers jumped at the chance to get free access to the net without having to always watch the clock and pay outrageous fees. In two hours, escapee.com brought 86 new people onto the net and raised \$3600 for a noncommercial radio station. This means something. These are swarms of people in our society who want to listen to what we are saying and who understand our spirit, if not our language. The hacker spirit has manifested itself in many of us but it has dormant in a far greater number.

If we have an opportunity to reach still more people, we should. Some won't understand but those who do could turn out to be very important to the hacker world. Only when the general public begins to see that there is far more to us than what they read in tabloids will their perception of us begin to change. And that could change everything.

It's always been in the interests of the phone companies and corporate online services to paint us in as evil a light as possible. Then they can continue to play by their rules, charging consumers as much as they want and not having anyone credible to challenge them. But a growing number of people are realizing that it's not as black and white as these entities want us to believe.

We've seen it happen twice in Holland. The United States is long overdue. But this isn't the only "Hacker Congress" happening this year. On October 7, 8, and 9, the "First International Congress about Viruses,

Hacking, and the Computer Underground" will take place in Buenos Aires, Argentina at the Centro Cultural Republica. From 18:30 from 3 pm to 9 pm. We're happy to learn that there is a thriving hacker culture there as well and we hope many Americans and Argentines attend both events.

According to the organizers, "the congress will be oriented to discuss subjects related to hacking, viruses, and the technology impact in the society of now and in the future. We will also have discussions about cyberpunk, virtual reality, the Internet, the phone system, programming, etc.... We expect the congress to be as open as possible, offering freedom to speak to all attendees; being from the 'bad' or 'good' side of the discussed issues. As we in Argentina don't yet have laws against hacking or virus writing or spreading, we think it is very important to discuss all these items as freely and deeply as possible." For more information, send email to: fernando@ubik.sadink.net, FidoNet: 4-901/303. You can phone +54-1-654-0459 or fax +54-1-40-5110 or send paper mail to: Gueanos 160, ofo 2, Ramos Mejia (Truj), Provincia de Buenos Aires, Republica Argentina. Admission to this event is, incredibly enough, totally free.

There are a lot of bad things we can focus on - the Chipper chip, increased surveillance, technological rigipits, imprisoned hackers, and so much more. But there's also a great deal to be optimistic about. We've got the means to see things in different, non-traditional ways and, most importantly, share these perceptions with each other. This August, we'll have the chance to take that one step further. It may be the only hope we have.

Life under GTD5

by Zapfraud

Specific Telephone Telecommunications

First let me state that I am aware that GTD5 is not an actual, physical switch, but rather a software protocol thingy that can run on numerous switches. GTE uses CMS-100's, ESS's - I have even heard that some small GTE areas use PBX switches designed for businesses.

GTD5 is a strange switch to be under. The most obvious sign of a GTD5 switch is having to dial xxx to access special features (cancel call waiting, call forwarding, etc.) as opposed to dialing 'xx' under the more common switches.

In fact, the first thing that I noticed under GTD5 is that the # key is a strange kind of enter key; it will toll the switch 'I'm all done now, process my digits.' I'm not sure what the significance of this is, or what can be done with it.

Also worth knowing is that there are various sub-versions of GTD5. I am under GTD5.0311.2 in Camerillo. (That's interesting because the last time I checked it was 5.0111.2! I just checked now, and surprise! Both 5.0111.2 and 5.0311.2 are the same, as far as I can tell, and the 112 part has never changed. Oxnard, a city nearby, uses just GTD5d and they do not yet have the Proctor Test Set. I suspect that's where the 5.01 part comes in. Thousand Oaks has 5.01. Not I extension. I have absolutely no idea what the extension means...

Whenever I dial a call, before the ring I hear silence, and after the first starts doing something (i.e., ringing, busy, etc.), I can hear a quiet, high pitched sound. It really strain my ears (if that possible?). I believe this is the sound that the digital to analog converter makes, as it sounds about the right frequency for it. I like this, because I have 3-way calling, and it lets me know when to flash the other line on, without having to wait for a ring signal.

11X Dialing Features

GTD5 provides a wide variety of switch-based tools for insertion to use. These tools fall in the 11X dialing area. They cannot be

dialled of the back of a local PBX that I use, probably because there is a direct link into the GTE switch via optical cable, and to have copper line leading features would be silly. Here is a list and description of them, as they are found in our area. Note that they vary from area to area, but that they are still going to be 11X numbers. For example, the Proctor Test Set in Los Angeles is not 117, but rather 111. This is the list as it appears in Camerillo, 115, 119, and 113 work as described in Oxnard and Thousand Oaks. Thousand Oaks also has 117 identical to that of Camerillo.

111 - No real function. Next-to message I have not heard anywhere else. Rings immediately after dialing third one. Answers after one to four rings with "We're sorry, your call cannot be completed as dialed. Please check your instruction manual, or call the repair office for assistance." Basically it tells the technician the switch is up.

112 - Have not discovered anything or no function.

113 - Storage method of dialing. You can dial 113-75, and if 7D is a phone number that is in your exchange, then one of two things will happen. It will connect exactly like a regular call (even requires 25 cents from a payphone, deposited before call, and yields same error message if coin is not deposited). It will come up with a other strange error message, "We're sorry, your call cannot be completed as dialed from this telephone. Please check the number and dial again, or call your operator for assistance."

If you dial any other number, whether it is local, zone unit (short distance) or long distance, it's not in your exchange, it will say that the call cannot be completed as dialed (the ordinary error message normally heard) and to check the number and dial again.

What determines whether a phone has 113-7D dialing capabilities or not I'm not sure of, but I can pass along the following findings:

Every payphone I have been at here 113-7D dialing go through, provided a quarter was deposited first.

The odds of a normal line allowing 113-7D to go through appear to be about 1:4, from the test dialing my friends and I have done.

Another interesting thing to note is that when I dial 153+ (Number of a payphone that does not accept incoming calls) from my line (not 113-7D compatible), I get the ordinary call cannot be completed message, but if I call the same number from a payphone, I hear the "from this telephone" message! This has led me to wonder if there are phones that can bypass the incoming call blocking. So far I have not found any.

114 - Local ANAC. Gives a single touch tone, then reads back your phone number. The official name is not "Local ANI", but I prefer calling it that as ANI is so much easier to remember (and say) when compared to the official name, ANAC.

115 - Have not discovered anything or no function.

116 - Limited data available. Waits for digits. After most says: "We're sorry, we cannot process your custom calling request at this time. Will you try again later please?" When I dial 116+8xx...., 116-5xx...., 116+7xx...., or 116-1xx.... nothing happened. After several digits, including 'ard k, got a typical error message. 116+8-4+ yields this message.

117 - Proctor Test Set (in my area). This is the nearest feature by far. See below for instructions.

118 - Have not discovered anything or no function.

119 - Line Open. This is identical to using the Proctor test set, option 12. It performs exactly the same function, and exists only for compatibility in Camerillo. Oxnard needs this test until they obtain GTD5.01 or better.

117 - Dist Test (in Oxnard). This test will beep four times, and beep an additional four times after each DTMF key pressed. It has no other apparent function.

The Proctor Test Set can be used for many things, the most common being:

Checking the wire key bugs
Turning up a red box
finger test (make your phone ring)
identifying a DTMF sign

Making the line go dead for a few minutes (open line)

Dial 117. You will hear the following menu. Bear in mind that you can always re-hear the menu either by waiting for it to replay or by flashing the hook and that a hookflash is a lot like an abort key. (Example: Proctor says "Please deposit coin" but you're calling from home experimenting. Just flash the hook and it goes on to the next part of the test.)

A word about the Proctor Test Set's numbering system - 0-9 are, quite obviously, 0-9. But a file known tests that all five keys can at some time or another be used as numerals, in a strange way. Here is a translation table:

- A - 10
- B - 11
- C - 12
- D - 13
- E - 14
- F - 15

This works because GTD5's tone decoder's thingy is set to dial mode, and those are the actual hexadecimal values it produces... In the other mode, row/column mode, the chip's first two bits will determine now, the last two, column. That mode is rarely used...

Interestingly, dialing 14 is the same as dialing 20. Ever see a little kid counting 'eighreen, ninteen, jenteen, elevenpenn'?

Well, Proctor does this. It's base ten hexadecimal! That's why dialing B works for dialing 11... the security feature apparently only starts looking to block out the config after the first one's dialed.

Also worthy of note is that if, in parameter select, you dial (a-1)e or (a-1)f, you will be read the number back as you dialed it! Example: Dialing 14e results in hearing "one ten" send back to you! But that's not why... Proctor doesn't know the word "ten" except as in "Please deposit ten cents" so I looked some more and found: 0-9 says "0-9". A says "Ten".

B says: "Twenty-Five"
C says: "Please go on hook"
D says: "Pass"

By doing this, you are listening to the hidden order of the sounds in Proctor's program, and actually learning a little about how it was made! Each sound has an ID#, and by Silver Daxing, you can find out some more sound IDV's!

Please be careful changing parameters. I turned ESS Select on, accidentally, this Sunday morning. It's now Sunday night and the test set still won't work. I'll have to wait until Monday for them to fix it. I guess!

The Main Menu

"Proctor Test Set"
(After the "Please" sounds, you may press menu selection)

Please select test:

- Line test dial 2
- Coin collect test dial 3
- Coin refund test dial 4
- Coin relay timing dial 5
- Coin test dial 6
- Party ground test dial 7
- Ringer test dial 8
- Party 2 ringer test dial 9
- Dial test dial 0
- Ack suppress telephone test dial 10
- Reverse line dial 12
- Line open dial 13
- Complete data mode dial 14
- Ack suppress test 1 dial 15
- Ack suppress test 2 dial 16
- 14 Coin Relay dial 17
- Far access to other tests dial 19.

Note that 11 and 18 do not appear on this list. More on that later....
Explanation
(Inside parenthesis is choice) Inside brackets is only heard if Complete Data Mode is on)

Line Test (dial 2)
The line test checks for problems on the line, namely that of shorts. It also, because of its on-hook nature, can be used to check the ringer.

What happens: There will be some clicks heard, and then it will say: "Line current (pass/fail) [xx milliamps]". This is how many amps the phone is sucking out of the wall. If more than one phone is picked up, the number will change to the

phone that sucks more, because picking up another phone causes the voltage to drop, i.e., the current should never be too much. Line test will then say "Loop leakage test. Please go on hook." At this point, hang up. Wait for the phone to ring, then answer. When you answer, it will say "Loop leakage (pass/fail) (exceeds 200 K Ohms/xx K Ohms) line ground (pass/fail) (exceeds 200 K Ohms/xx K Ohms)".

What this test you is the following: Line leakage - The impedance of the phone line when no phones are on hook. An off hook condition is generated at about 2K Ohms, but it should definitely be over 200K Ohms, although not unlike the ringers have to be attached. A fail condition will read the impedance of the line. Most bugs powered from the phone line will cause this test to fail. It could also indicate problems in the finger or water in the line. Line ground - like line leakage, only for the ground line. Playphones have a ground line, the yellow wire usually, and a failure here could indicate water in the lines or a faulty coin about.

Coin Collect Test (dial 3)

This test checks that the coin happens in a pay (farthest) telephone properly dumps coins into the storage area, where they will await a telephone man to pick them up. That is all it does. It will ask you to deposit a coin, when it will promptly dump into the storage area as soon as it reaches the hopper. No more information is given, even if complete data mode is on. Pass or fail is indicated by the path the coin takes. A sherman should see it come out the hole on the bottom left side of the phone. An unhappy phreaker will hear it clunk in with countable other coins, where it will become unrecoverable and property of GTE. For you technical folks, coin refund and coin collect signals are 100 volt pulses that are sent down the line, and grounded by the phone onto the yellow (ground) wire through the hopper controller.

Coin Refund Test (dial 4)

This test is exactly the same as the line coin collect test, except that the coin is sent out the bottom right side of the phone, or back into the coin refund test. It's fun to do, because it spoils them right back in. A

next flick to pull is deposit about \$5.00 in miscellaneous coins into the phone before selecting this test. Then call a friend over and say "Check this out." Select the test and drop in a nickel. Your amazed friend will watch your nickel, and all the other money that you stuck in (which was waiting in the hopper) come out, and probably never stop begging and pleading you to tell him or her how you did it!

Coin Relay Timing Test (dial 5)

This tests the timing of a coin ground pulse. It will respond with "Coin relay timing (pass/fail) [xxx milliseconds]". Typical values are between 500 and 700 milliseconds. The worst that the test timing of a coin.

Coin Test (dial 6)

"Please deposit coin...." This tests coin tone pulses. A typical coin pulse consists of 1700Hz and 2200Hz. A nickel is one pulse of 68 milliseconds, a dime is two such pulses separated by an equal time of silence, and a quarter is five 35 millisecond pulses separated by 33 milliseconds of silence. It will accept wild variations in timing, however. The frequencies must be within plus or minus 50Hz. The responses is: %Coin timing fail:(5 cents:10 cents:25 cents) Low-tone frequency (pass/fail) xxxxxHz High-tone frequency (pass/fail) xxxxxHz Low-tone level (pass/fail) negative xxxxxdB High-tone level (pass/fail) negative xx dB. Please deposit coin."

A great art to fishermen who need to fix the coin tone section on their red, etc. oh, payphones....

Party Ground Test (dial 7)

I'm not really sure what this does, but for me it says "Party ground (pass/fail) [xxx Ohms]"

Ringer Test (dial 8)

This test will ask you to hang up, then will ring your phone. When you answer, it will reply the menu. That's it!

Party 2 Ringer Test (dial 9)

I am unable to distinguish how this is even slightly different from a Ringer test....

Dial Test (dial 0)

This will do one of two things. If Complete Data Mode is on, it will ask you to "Please dial all digits." Dial then left to right, bottom to top (123456789 04). It will

respond with "Dial test (pass/fail)". If Complete Data Mode is on, it will ask you to "Please dial one digit." Dial a digit. It will then respond with Low-tone frequency (pass/fail) xxxxxHz High-tone frequency (pass/fail) xxxxxHz High-tone level (pass/fail) negative xx dB High-tone level (pass/fail) negative xx dB. Please dial one digit." Digits consist of one tone from the low-tone group and one tone from the high-tone group. The groups are as follows: Low Tone: 697Hz, 770Hz, 852Hz, 941Hz High Tone: 1209Hz, 1336Hz, 1477Hz, 1623Hz The high tone group describes the horizontal coordinate of the digit, whereas the low-tone group describes the vertical coordinate of the digit. By using this list in conjunction with the dial test with complete data mode on, one can identify any DTMF tone. There are, however, better ways to do this, but not with Proctor.

After selecting this test, you will hear: "Party one telephone. The current pass. Please dial all digits." Dial all of the digits. It will respond with "Dial test (pass/fail). Please dial one digit." Dial it, and listen to it say "Digit detected. Please go on hook." Hang up, and when the phone rings, pick up and it will tell you if the test passes or fails. Guessing what it's good for....

Configure Proctor Test Set (Dial 11 or B)
Like 15, this is not read on the menu. Also good to know is that access to this feature by dialing 11 can be turned off, so that it can only be accessed from the CO. But for one reason or another, dialing B will always work. After dialing 11 or B, a 3 digit security code may be needed. The default for this code is 000 (three zeros) and if the test set has been configured to block access via 11, then most likely you will be able to access it by dialing 8000, because they will not be anticipating that someone accesses it even possible!

The Set will then ask you to "Please select parameter". It will not read a list of parameters, but will identify a parameter after it is keyed). To select a parameter, dial its number, then dial 8. The Set will then read the parameter number, name, and its current value. It will then ask you to enter a

new value. You do this by either dialing the new value and hitting pound or, if it's a toggle value, typing * (asterisk pound). Note that I'm not exactly positive that * is correct, but it works for me!

Parameter List:

- 1 - Dial Speed Low Limit (set to 8.0 pps)
- 2 - Dial Speed High Limit (set to 11.0 pps)
- 3 - Dial Ratio Low Limit (set to 68%)
- 4 - Dial Ratio High Limit (set to 64%)
- Parameters 1-4 are for pulse dialing. pps is "pulses per second" and the percentages refer to percentage of time off-hook vs. on-hook.
- 5 - Tone Dial frequency tolerance (set to 1.5%)
- 6 - Tone Dial Level High (set to 36dB)
- 7 - Tone Dial Level Low (set to -20dB)
- 8 - Twist High Limit (set to 4dB)
- 9 - Twist Low Limit (set to -6dB)
- Parameters 5-9 are for tone dialing. Twist refers to the ratio of low-frequency to high-frequency in the DTMF tone.
- 10 - Line Ground leakage (set to 100Kohm)
- Refers to minimum on-hook resistance that is acceptable between phone wires and ground wire)
- 11 - Loop Leakage (set to 100Kohm)
- Refers to minimum on-hook resistance that is acceptable between red and green wires.
- 12 - Loop Current low limit (set to 20 milliamperes)
- Refers to the minimum amount of current an off-hook phone may draw. There is no maximum as the current draw is limited by the switch itself.
- 13 - Party Ground high limit (set to 3.0 Kohm)
- 14 - Party Ground low limit (set to 1.0 Kohm)
- 15 - Coin Tone frequency tolerance (set to 1.5%)

How many should Proctor be about your red box?

- 16 - Coin Tone level high (set to 0 dB)
- 17 - Coin Tone level low (set to -25 dB)
- 18 - Coin Ground high (set to 1.5Kohm)
- 19 - Coin Ground low (set to .5 Kohm)
- 20 - Security Code (set to 000, default, changeable by user!)

- 21 - Security Code (on/off)
- 22 - Line Reverse (set to off, default value)
- 23 - 1A Coin Relay (set to off, default value)

24 - User Program is on (????)

- 25 - Dial Timing (set to 10.0) (???)
- 26 - ESS Select (set to off)
- 27 - Coin Tone Frequency select (set to 2) (type of coin tones)
- 28 - Coin relay timing, low limit (set to 500 milliseconds)
- 29 - Coin relay timing, high limit (set to 700 milliseconds) How picky is Proctor about your paper-clip technique?
- 30 - 1A Coin relay timing low limit (set to 400 milliseconds)
- 31 - 1A Coin relay timing high limit (set to 600 milliseconds)
- 1A users better have quick paper-clip motion!
- 32 - Coin Return Current (set to - (negative))
Set to positive, watch the lineman lose his quarters when he does a coin test
- 33 - Divided digit test (is off) (???)
- 34 - Remove Coin Ground Test (set to on)
- 35 - Illegal Parameter
- 35 - Telephone Dial access to parameter program (set to off)
This means I can't dial 11 to use it... but dialing 0 works!
- 37 - Illegal Parameter
- Reverse line (dial 12 or C)
- This will exchange, temporarily, the tip and ring wires, thereby reversing the polarity of the line. On payphones in my area, the DTMF dial circuit will not work after doing this, because there is no bridge resistor on it. The line will be changed back to normal if you flash the hook, hang up, or dial 13 again.
- Line Open (dial 13 or D)
- This removes the phone from the switch for about 45 seconds. This is very similar to dialing the wires to the phone. What this is good for is if a lineman wants to test line impedance with a VOM, check the line for stray voltage, etc. It's also handy for staking quarters from people too dumb to check for dialtone at a payphone... open the line, hang up (it doesn't know it you

hang up - How can it with no voltage (and therefore no sensor ability) on the line) and just wait for Joe Sucker to deposit a quarter. Then come back and pick up the phone. Wait patiently for the last man and when you hear it, select Coin Return Test. Deposit a nickel, and you get \$.30 back!

Complete Data Mode (dial 14 or 1)

This is a toggle modifier (that controls whether the test set will read back everything it knows, or just a pass/fail condition. Every time you dial 14, its status will be toggled. Its default value is off. Pressing the * key will also select complete data mode. This is convenient, as it's probably the most often used feature.

Ack Suppress Test 1 (dial 15 or 4)

"Please deposit five cents." "Please deposit initial rate."

Ack Suppress Test 2 (dial 16)

"Please deposit five cents." "Please deposit ten cents." "Please deposit 25 cents."

1A Coin Relay (dial 17)

This is a toggle modifier that controls how the system interprets coin timing. Its default is off. Apparently the ESS1A switch used different timing in its coin tones, and there are still some 1A payphones in use. I believe the Radio Shack Dialer 6.5535 kHz Crystal combination produces the 1A tones, but I am unsure.

GTD version number (dial 18)

This will tell you the version number of the GTD switch you are under. This kind of thing is essential for these phone phreaks who are "socialized" and wish to learn more.

For access to other tests, dial 19. The other tests are some tests. Not like dial and redbox, but the other way around. They spit tones out into your phone. Nothing special though. The tone tests can be used for measuring frequency response, signal to noise ratio (a zero tone test amplitude vs. a milliwatt test tone amplitude) and other nifty things. One thing I like is option number 7, at a payphone. It is so loud that it can be heard for up to 25 or 35 feet away on a quiet day!

How is a list of the tests:

Milliwatt test tone (dial 2)

Lasts for 3 minutes, ie full blast 1000Hz tone

Zero Tone test 1 (dial 3)

Lasts for 3 minutes, absolute silence. Great for measuring line noise.

Zero Tone test 2 (dial 4)

Identical to Zero Tone test 1, as far as it can tell.

Three tone test (dial 5)

1000Hz for 15 seconds, 500 Hz for 15 seconds, 2000Hz for 15 seconds.

10 tone test (dial 6)

10 tone ack suppress test (dial 7)

Pressing 0 will return one to the main menu.

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CORDLESS FUN

by Susan Chumaki
NYMPHO

*(From Tech Menopausal
Phone Book Menopausal)*

Did you know that you can legally monitor people on their cordless phones? "Whoopie!" you say? Well, I think it's stupendous! More and more people are getting cordless and even, I am exceedingly likely to get for cordless scanning, let's jinx it! His of into flow over my cordless (albeit those incarnations).

Yes, even though cellular is a no-no, you are certainly legally allowed to dial around in your car and tape people's cordless conversations. Or you can do it on foot. Receivers that pick up 40-50 MHz go for around \$100. I suggest ignoring Ray Starck and heading down to your local ham club or ham store - ham stores are great because they are almost always jumpstarts. Not only can you get a bargain, you might be able to find an old receiver that picks up the now banned 800 MHz frequencies.

Even though I've owned my receiver for less than a week, I already can categorize most conversations: 1) nuthers talking about their children; 2) husbands talking about handyman work, computers or organizational/week market; 3) people talking in Spanish, Greek, Korean, etc.; 4) girls talking about sex with other girls; 5) boyfriend/girlfriend conversations. However, I'm sure everyone can find very interesting cases, especially since you can drive up to someone's house and "listen" whether or not they have cordless. (A seam of a local barber yanked his father talking about drugs with another guy, yep. Also, we picked up a guy talking about his BBS's doors and (yikes!) chess match screen savers.) I'm sure your local congressman or equities trader has things to say that you'd like to get on a TDK tape. Or whatever.

AT&T is obviously one of the most popular brands of cordless phones in the States, and I

have the specs for two of their models, an older one (S300) and the newer one (S315):

Channel	B41	H-B
1*	46.61	49.67
2	46.63	49.846
3	46.67	49.80
4*	46.71	49.77
5	46.73	49.875
6	46.77	49.83
7	46.83	49.89
8*	46.87	49.93
9	46.93	49.99
10	46.97	49.97

The AT&T S315 has 10 channels, while the S300 has only 3, which are the ones started above (1, 4, and 8 on the S315 are 1, 2, and 3 respectively on the S300). All the frequencies listed are in Megahertz. There are two frequencies for each possible channel that a conversation can be on, the Base to Handset side and the Handset to Base side. The B-H side is the one to "scan" with because 1) it has the legal and the remote value, thus you hear a raw, raw conversation; 2) since the base unit is plugged in (120 volts), its signal is stronger than the handset's, and you can pick it up farther away than with the handset side. The H-B side also has its advantages: 1) as you can hear only the handset signal, you can discern the local speaker from the remote speaker; 2) as the H-B signal has a shorter radius than the B-H, you can "bounce in" on where the speaker is, useful when you are working in a well-populated area. You might even be able to get these frequencies with an old handheld radio or a walkie-talkie used at work. The base would probably be to get a portable scanner to plug into your car's cigarette lighter, and look up a very good antenna to your car's fount. However, it can be done without a car just as easily, with a scanner in one pocket, a tape recorder in the other, and a pair of headphones over your ears.

I'd keep all of this a secret, but as Benny says, "Coping means sharing!"

The 2600 voice bbs has a new number:

ADMINS WITHOUT A CLUE

By Kevin Crow

Here is a collection of quotes that have been gathered during the recent past that express a portion of security that I would like to entitle "Pamose Last Words":

"If someone's hacked our system, we'd certainly like to know about it, although it's very doubtful more liberty. This is just someone trying to make you nervous."

Here we have the system administrators of Nescora Communications out of San Jose, California responding to a very real hack on their system. This kind of attitude towards security will oftentimes lead to disaster.

"Sorry for not responding sooner. I'd just get our email, your account has been restored. Your home directory was accidentally misplaced due to our error."

In another letter, Nescora actually blamed themselves, not even considering the possibility. Way to go!

"Your home directory has been restored. Please let us know if you have any more trouble."

These sorts of security back are often times directed towards a person specifically, but sometimes they can be much more malicious. Perhaps next time there is "more trouble" they won't need to be told, they'll just find out themselves when they're staring directly at empty disks.

"We have no record of removing your account, but we apologize for any inconvenience we have caused."

Again, if they refuse to keep their eyes open, they may have no records at all!

Now I'd like to move on to another collection. This one comes from a computer science university. In the words of the system admin:

"About 40 percent of the passwords on the computer release system have been cracked."

At least in this case, the security administration was admitting to problems.

"If you leave laptops sitting in front of the street, somebody's going to take one."

"It's not possible to make a system completely secure."

Yes, this is true. But there are at least certain measures to be taken so that compromising system security isn't as easy as picking lockpicks off the floor.

"If people become more aware of the possible penalties, there will be many fewer people that will be willing to take those risks."

This is not a solution to system security, as situations there is simply no way to track down the people involved. Threats like these can lead to challenges in the eyes of some system admins.

"The system is secure from everyone who is properly using the System."

Brilliant. Now that they've mastered that, perhaps it would be a good idea to secure the system from those who aren't using it properly! Security is an issue that is a constant. Security isn't set up so keep out the people who aren't going to try to come in anyway. If it were, it wouldn't be called security.

"I don't think we'd use that password for any other phase of our files."

Well, it seems to me that if "that standard" isn't used for any phase of his life, then maybe he should consider his arrogance to computer security, and do something about it. Otherwise, he really is taking no action towards computer security.

I hope that those of you reading this will benefit from this arrogance. While it's not always possible to spend time securing a system, the first step is recognizing that a security problem can exist!

(516) 473-2626

HACKING PRODIGY

by Devillage Fool

Before I start I would like to tell you a little story. Not too long ago I used to be a Prodigy subscriber. One day I had this idea of changing my real name to a better one, "Fuck Face". Well, the next day I received an E-mail from Prodigy saying that "..." is not allowed. So I figured, OK, I'll change my name to "Fuck Face". No "..." here. The next day Prodigy forwards me another E-mail saying that this kind of language is "inappropriate in a family service" (whatever that's supposed to mean). Once again I changed my name. This time to "Fuck Face". English is not my first language but from what I can tell, "Fuck" is not even a word, right? No. Apparently, the Prodigy police have their own English version. They were quick to respond with a third threat.

Three days had passed and the "Fuck Face" gig was getting kind of old. I figured why mess around with that cursed ID when I had four other fresh ID's to play with. I registered a legitimate name on a new ID and put the entire "Fuck Face" controversy to rest. Or so I thought.

Not a week had passed before a fourth E-mail had arrived. This time from God himself - the Board Manager. He made it short and simple, "Change your name or get locked out of the service." I politely replied, "Kiss my fucking ass!" and now whenever I log onto the service I get the following message: "There is a problem with your account. Please call customer service at 800-778-2448 for assistance."

I guess I can't change the world. But with a little help from 2600 I can sure write this article.

Prodigy is just like Compuserve, Genie, etc. They all run off the same basic format. They have an account and a password which is the password of whatever chosen by the owner of the account.

A Prodigy ID consists of four letters plus two digits, plus any letter between A and E (a letter for each member of the household).

(the main ID is always "A").

Example:
DDVF69A

I would estimate that about 10 percent of the users will use some part of their name in the password.

Example:

Account DDVF69A

Owner: Jamie Wallis

PW:JWY

or Jamie

Wallis

Jam

That is just an example. And with about 10 percent of the people being dumb enough to do that you would think that you would have a real good chance, and in reality, you do. But consider this - there are usually about 5000 users who share any one name. Ten percent of 300 is 30. Thirty users out of 300 - that is still going to be a fun little job just to find one of these idiots. So don't just jump in thinking that you have made.

I have never found any programs like Pop Code Hacker. So, most of the work that you have to do will have to be done manually, which will turn many people off. So if you are lazy and unlucky, the real one is for you.

First thing you'll need is the Prodigy Software. If you don't have the software you can copy it from a friend or you may buy the Prodigy Start-Up Kit for \$30.

Go to Sears, Radio Shack, or any other store that provides an on-line demonstration of Prodigy (the system of a faithful friend will also do nicely). Ask for a demonstration. Memorize the ID and the password length as they are being entered (a " " will be displayed for each character of the password). When they log off, wait for them to leave and follow the simple three-step procedure (the whole deal should take you no longer than 15 seconds): 1. From the dos prompt type DE3UG.

2. Type 90 FFF0 plus the 3 characters of the ID, starting with the fourth column from the left.

Example: If the ID is DDVF69A you will type 90 FFF0 F08" (remember to always capitalize).

The computer will display all the locations of the disk sectors where F09 was located (usually 1-4 locations will be displayed).

3. Next, type C plus the number after the " " of the disk sector which you located in Step 2.

Example: If the disk sector is 12FF-1170 type D1170. Repeat this step for each disk sector number you locate.

Each time you execute the "D" command, the computer will display the sector with the partial ID plus seven other sectors. If the password is displayed it will in most cases follow right after the ID. Most passwords chosen by stores are very stereotypical since they must appeal to the minds of their dim-witted employees and will be extremely easy to detect if placed between a line of "garbage". While the password may not be displayed in every hacking session, you should have a solid three out of five success rate!

Here is how a complete hacking session may look where ID = DDVF69A and PW = ASSHOLE:

C:\>DEBUG
-90 FFF0 "F09"
12FE-1170
-041170

```
12FE-1170 41 12 06 07 34 21 37 62-39 92 11 20 33 14 28 F09A ASSHOLE 06.1
12FE-1180 2E 12 06 09 59 00 00 00-00 7A 00 00 00 7A 12 7.25Y .....1..
12FE-1190 EB 12 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9A ..... ".....
12FE-11A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
12FE-11B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
12FE-11C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
12FE-11D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
12FE-11E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
C:\>
```

Oh Prodigy you get unlimited hours and up to six people can be on the same ID at the same time! Still, it's a good idea to set up your own ID and password when you first log in (just don't use your real name!). This can only be done through the main ID, "A", as long as there are empty ID's left (there are a total of five ID's to every account). This will insure that you won't get locked out in case the password changes.

One way to prolong your visit is to order a brand new account through the hacked ID. This is a service provided by Prodigy. The entire transaction costs \$2.

Once you receive the new account, simply register it on a fake name and a fake address. There is a down side: since the new account will be E-mailed to the hacked ID, you'll have to be the first to grab it. By the time the ID owner receives his unusual bill and Prodigy's brainless employees even begin to assess the situation, you should have a full month of worry-free service. Never repeat this step under a previously ordered account.

HOPE

for change

Hacking the SMALL Stuff

by Leonardo Brandman

I've always been a hacker. When I was in third grade, the math tests that my class would be subjected to had the answers at the bottom of the page, encrypted with a simple substitution cipher. The code changed from week to week. Rather than work the whole quest, I'd just do the first few problems, double check them carefully, then crack the code, and fill out the rest of the quiz in no time. Sometimes I'd even pass the code along to the other kids.... Wasn't this a whole lot harder than just doing the arithmetic? Of course it was. The cost-benefit ratio was definitely not in my favor, but I just had to figure this stuff out. And it's that spirit of inquiry that is, to me, what hacking is all about.

This article won't give the details on the latest switches the RBOCs are installing, nor will it tell how to reverse-engineer your cellular phone. In fact, most of the hacks I'm about to describe are quite obsolete. What I hope they will do, though, is illustrate some of the thought processes that go into hacking, and show how a hacker should always take time to play with technology, and be constantly alert to the little details that most other people overlook.

Automatic Teller Machines

There are several different varieties of ATM's. On the version at my old bank, I always played around, trying different sequences of keypresses whenever I used it. I found that if, at the end of my first transaction, I requested "another" transaction, then immediately pulled my card out of the slot before the machine could suck it back in, the machine would lower the window that possessed its display, and a little red "CLOSED" sign would pop up. The machine would then stay down for about five minutes, as it began checking and cycling each component (envelope slot, bill counter, etc.) in sequence. Presumably, it was performing some sort of diagnostic self-test. How intuitive, then, the sign would switch back to "OPEN" and the ATM would resume its usual behavior.

After a couple of years, the firmware on

these machines got revised, and this trick no longer worked. But I still try doing weird things during ATM transactions, just to see what else I might discover. If I ever my card, well, it'll arrive in my mail a week or two later....

Old Calculators

When I was in high school, calculators were rather large things with LED displays that are basically like cars. I had a Texas Instruments TI-30 calculator that did little more than square, multiply, and add fractions. All the keys were arranged in a standard rectangular matrix, one where each key, when pressed, closed a circuit between one vertical and one horizontal wire. This kind of arrangement of course precludes any meaningful decoding when multiple keys are pressed simultaneously.

One day, while deconstructing my fingers second on the calculator (which was turned off), some LED segments lit up! Intrigued, I started experimenting. The ON/CLEAR and OFF buttons were part of the same matrix as the rest of the keys. Of course, with the power off, there would be no way for the ON/CLEAR key to be detected, so it was wired to an additional circuit. This meant, though, that the separate circuit could be triggered, not only by pressing the ON/CLEAR key, but by pressing any combination of keys that would complete a circuit between the row and column of the ON/CLEAR key. In fact, the OFF key worked the same way. So now I could turn my calculator on and off without touching the ON and OFF keys.

That was rifty, but utterly worthless, so I'll move on to a more interesting calculator: the Sharp EL-512. I bought this one several years after the TI-30. It had an LCD display, and six kinds of useful functions, like two-variable statistics, programmability, factorials, and hexadecimal conversion. Sometimes, though, it would get confused and put garbage on the screen - not even numbers, just odd LCD segments. Of course, I had to figure out why and how this happened, so I could spell out words on my (insert: only) display.

Here is what I found: When a hexadecimal conversion is performed, the EL-512 checks to make sure that the number is not already expressed in hex. (This calculator produces the current mode of hex conversion, which is to have a separate mode for each base: "hex mode", etc.) If the number is already in hex, no conversion is performed. When the conversion occurs in a program, however, no such check is made, and the jumbled-up screen resulted from attempting to convert to hex a number that was already expressed in hex.

The four segments on the top half of the display were consistent: they were the upper four segments of the number which had been previously displayed. The bottom segments, though, depended on the calculations which had gone before. Presumably I deconstructed them to be dependent only upon the value in the accumulator register. These segments would be activated as follows:

Starting from the third digit of the number in the accumulator, each bit in that digit would correspond to a segment in the lower part of the digit on the display (starting from the first digit on the display, so only the top segments of the last two digits could be controlled).

Getting the desired value into the accumulator was trivial: the EL-512 had a key marked with a double-headed arrow, pointing up and down. The function was to swap the value in the display register with the value in the accumulator register. Its intended use was to enter ordered pairs of values for the two-variable statistics; you would enter X, press this button to store X in the accumulator, then enter Y. (It could, of course, be used for other things, such as recalling the last intermediate value in a series of calculations after the final result was needed.)

Here's an example: With the display reading "5831058180" and the accumulator containing 19000900, the result would be "PPELELLE" with a display of "C99C8B11" and an accumulator value of 9000931. The result would be "GoodCAl".

And so on. Not of any practical value, but amusing.... I kept a small slip of paper with that calculator, listing all of the characters I could produce with the method. With upright and inverted. Upright, I could recognizeably generate versions of:

ACEFHHJLNUYQZ

The upside-down character set I'll leave as an exercise for the reader....

Wending Machines

Hacking wending machines and other coin-op devices is a whole topic unto itself. But this example illustrates the spirit of restoring that led to my discovery of the hack.

There is a type of wending machine which has horns stacked in metal spirals. When you make your selection, the spiral wire runs one full revolution, effectively receiving a single package (candy bar, bag of chips, or whatever) at the end, dropping it into the hopper below. Nowadays, most of these machines have a panel where you can specify the row and column of your choice, but earlier versions of these machines simply had one button per selection.

The machine in the office where I worked was of the latter type, and had two separate banks of buttons, about 20-25 buttons on each. Now, I found myself wondering why the buttons had been segregated into two separate banks. The segregation was not really significant enough to be helpful in locating your selection, and they did not seem to have any logical separation between them, either. I concluded that they were put into two separate banks because of some internal limitation, some circuit that could only read one bank of buttons at a time, resembling the hack:

I had already tried putting my money into the machine, then simultaneously pressing two buttons in the same bank. It was simply a race: whichever button closed first would determine the selection I got. How now I need pressing two corresponding buttons, one in each bank, at the same time. Sure enough, as long as I had put in enough coins to cover the more expensive of the two items, BOTH coins would turn, and I'd get two snacks for the price of one.

In Conclusion

I see many people asking, in letter columns, on the net, on BBS's, the same question: "How can I become a hacker?" The answer, of course, is always the same: experiment, play around, try to figure out for yourself just how the technology works. That hacking isn't just phones and computers - the same process can be applied to the small stuff that we come into contact with every day. Never miss an opportunity to practice your hacking skills!

dtmf decoder

By Paul Bergeman

In the Spring 1994 issue of 2600, Ken Kilroy described a circuit that decodes DTMF touch tone signals and transmits that information to a Commodore 64 or VIC-20 computer. This article expands on that by detailing how to interface a simple DTMF decoder circuit to an IBM compatible computer via its parallel port. Since IBM-compatibles comprise the vast majority of existing computers, this solution is fairly universal. Information contained in this article was taken from my new book, *Control The World With Your Computer*.

If you don't already own an IBM-compatible computer, older PC/DXT and AT-type computers are often available for under \$100 at hamfests, auctions, etc. Far from being obsolete, many uses can be found for these inexpensive and ubiquitous computers. This article describes in detail a simple circuit and software that will monitor a telephone line, decode all DTMF signals, and log the data to a computer. It will even decode the A, B, C, and D "Silver-Box" tones used by telcos, the military, ham radio operators, and COCCOTs (Customer-Owned Corded-Operated Telephones).

Theory: DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency) tones, or touch tones, are, as their name implies, comprised of a pair of audio sine waves. There are eight defined frequencies (four rows and four columns) ranging from 697 to 1633 cycles-per-second (Hertz). The two frequencies that illustrate a 4x4 matrix make up each of the 16 DTMF tones: 0 - 9, *, A, B, C, and D. The fourth column (1233 Hz) isn't used on consumer telephones, but is used on the U.S. military's AUTODIVON telephone network to designate routing priority. As just mentioned, it is also used internally by some telcos, ham radio repeater systems, and some COCCOTs for maintenance purposes.

Touch tone signals were developed by the Bell System over 30 years ago for in-band telephone signaling. The audio frequencies were carefully chosen to avoid harmonic interference and false triggering by voice signals. The signaling format is so effective that applications for it expanded far beyond the scope they were intended for: Vocoder, audiotex, paging, and data entry/telex/m

systems are some examples. You can input data collected from a remote location to your computer over a twisted pair. DTMF signals can even be transmitted over the airwaves via an inexpensive FM transmitter, received with a tracking FM receiver, and decoded by your computer. Working in reverse, I have used a DTMF-encoded FM transmitter/receiver pair to control a small robotic vehicle with my computer.

Not too many years ago, one had to painstakingly construct and debug a separate circuit to decode each Touch-Tone. No more. Several companies now manufacture decoded IC chips designed to decode, filter, and convert all DTMF signals to binary numbers. Basically, you plug audio containing DTMF tones in one end, and get a binary number out the other. The IC does all the work. The circuit illustrated here is based on the popular 5970 DTMF decoder chip.

The Circuit
Figure 1 shows a circuit for decoding DTMF signals and interfacing them to an IBM-compatible computer via its parallel printer port. Nearly all parts can be purchased at Radio Shack or from Dig-Key (see parts list). Construction layout is not critical, and the circuit can be laid out and soldered on a Radio Shack project board. You may want to solder DIP sockets for the two IC chips on the board and plug the chips in later to prevent thermal damage from soldering. Because of their low cost, (about \$10.00) a second parallel port card is recommended for your PC instead of repeatedly swapping your printer cable.

Hammer brass reinforced the wheel and design my own phone line interface from scratch. I used Radio Shack's 43-258 "Telephone Answering Control" (324-951). This handy device provides microphone-level audio from the phone line and an electronic switch closure in response to an "off-hook" condition. Drawing its power from the phone line, it is FCC-approved for direct connection to the dial-up network and can be attached anywhere along the phone line - from the telephone itself all the way back to the central office switch. An RJ11 coupler, RJ11-to-spade-lead cable, and silagator clips make the connection a snap. The "SERVOTE" plug, (assigned to software




FIGURE 1: DTMF DECODER VIA PARALLEL PRINTER PORT

REM FILE: PAPER.PAP WRITEN IN ORBITO, BY PAUL SAUNDERS

REM TRAPS 4 BIT DATA FROM AN 8080, AND DELIVER TO DIRECT CONNECTION.

REM USE AN 8080-COMPATIBLE SERIAL OUTPUT PORT. OUTPUT FROM THE

8080 MUST BE SENT FROM THE SERIAL PORT'S DATA ADDRESS + 1. (E

8080 OF THE (DATA ADDRESS + 1). THE 8080 WILL BE USED TO TRANSMIT

THE SERIAL DATA. WHEN WE WANT TO GET SERIAL DATA, THE NEW BYTE VALUE IS

SENT DISPLAYED ON THE SCREEN. THE 8080 CAN ALSO BE USED AS A PARALLEL

8080. (FORWARD AND REVERSE) INPUT. IF SOME ADDITIONAL

8080 SOFTWARE IS WANTED, THIS ADDRESS CAN BE OPERATED BY A 700 SECTION.

REM THE PROGRAM SENDS A FILE TO DIRECT DATA (DATA), ALL FILES SHOULD WITH

REM 8080, FOLLOWED BY FOUR DIGITS CODING TODAY'S DATE. THE EXAMPLES: 11

REM TODAY'S DATE IS 12/23/1984, THE PROGRAM SENDS A FILE NAMED:

REM 12231984

REM ALL FROM SIGNALS SHOULD BE 12/23, WILL BE STORED IN THE FILE

REM 12231984. EACH RECORD IN THE FILE WILL START WITH THE DATA

REM THE NUMBER WAS TAKEN OFF-BOARD, FOLLOWED BY ALL 8080 DATA. ALL

REM FILES WILL BE SAVED ON 8080. THE FILE WILL INCLUDE A 10-100'S

REM VALUE QUANTIZED FROM 10 PAGES. IF THE NUMBER IS INPUT FROM THE

REM UNITS, THE PROGRAM CLOSURE THE SERIAL ERROR AND WANTS FOR AN

REM OFF-BOARD SIGNAL TO START A NEW RECORD.

REM

REM EACH DAY KEYS A NEW FILE, IS OPERATING AT RECEIVED THE PROGRAM

REM CLOSURE THE SERIAL FILE AND OPENS A NEW ONE FOR THE NEW DATA.

REM

REM ON THE NEW ONE POSITION, PRESS 'B'

REM

REM ONE FOLLOWING TO ENTER NEW EQUIPMENT:

REM CPU (M8080), SERIAL (SERIO), ADDRESS (SERIO), 375 (SERIO) WRITE

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

REM

END (SerialAddress + 2), 1: NEW AND ALL BITS WITH 00001100

Transmit = SerialPortAddress - 2): REM TO 2 DTH LOW PRESENT

OFFEND = SerialPortAddress + 1)

IF OFFEND AND IC = 00 THEN 9000 DataOutput

200000 = TRANS: ELSEWAIT - FORTICE - WAITING

IF (SerialPortAddress + 120) THEN 9000 OFFEND

IF (SerialPortAddress + 10) AND (SerialPortAddress + 5) AND '2' = 1 THEN

Transmit = SerialPortAddress - 8'

END IF

DisplayOutput: 100

IF (SerialPortAddress AND 001 = 00) THEN 9000 SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress = SerialPortAddress - 1): REM SERIAL DELAYED 10000000

REM '1' = Format new data as two bytes: 10 = 00 1-

SerialPortAddress = SerialPortAddress + 100

IF (SerialPortAddress AND 128) = 128 THEN

SerialPortAddress = (SerialPortAddress - 128) + 2) - 128

9000 SerialPortAddress

IF 000

SerialPortAddress = SerialPortAddress - 2)

END IF

SerialPortAddress = SerialPortAddress - 15)

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

SerialPortAddress

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monitoring keystrokes

by Dr. Dalem

It seems as though many people have been working on the same concept for some time now... capturing keystrokes to obtain passwords. I've had presented a description in the Spring 1994 issue of 2005 of the IBM "Keycap" program that is a TSR which latches BIOS interrupt 15h. I was both happy to see this and at the same time a bit surprised.

In 1990 I was living in a two bedroom apartment with four people... at PBS headquarters. With ERS parties were an ongoing event, something very odd, it wasn't long before I hit me that with all the parties that took place from the apartment, I had a way to capture keystrokes I would rule the local PBS scene... as was the case after the development of TRAP.EXE, I made mention to Dream Pilot, an old hacker who had been programming for years (the best programmer I know) and is acquainted with one of the three men who wrote COSMOS. He wrote TRAP.EXE in assembly and decided he wanted the rights as well as the undocumented exception on the same files so he gave to "turn" the captures to him. This was fine for a while, but the speed got to me and I had to either crack the encryption or develop something on my own... I chose the latter.

The first two weeks of May 1991 I spent working on the DEPL program. DEPL is an acronym for "Dale's Elite Password Looter" (OK so I'm a little arrogant). On May 15th I had my first version ready for distribution. DEPL is a system of four executable files written in C and an implementation and recovery of passwords. DEPL.COM is the core program and is not a TSR, but a shell program which, when run, launches the keyboard hardware interrupt 9 and then executes the target program. The three other executables are: supporting programs: INSTALL.EXE, SCHARP.EXE, and DEKODER.EXE. As the names imply, INSTALL will install the system, SCHARP will save the captures from the system, and DEKODER will decode the captures. When INSTALL or SCHARP are run, they will do their work with no screen I/O, and proceed to run whatever program you point them to. This effectively makes the installation and recovery processes "stealth" in that you can have someone standing there watching as you run your "game" or whatever and they will be none the wiser.

Unbeknownst to me, Chris Boyes, just miles away in the same state and at approximately the same time, was writing a program called KEYCOPY which also performs keystroke

capturing. I wasn't until the year that I discovered KEYCOPY version 1.01, written May 25, 1991 (I believe). KEYCOPY is not the complicated shell system that DEPL is, but it is a TSR like Keyhoops.

The following is an excerpt from "The KEYCOPY.DOC" file:

You use KEYCOPY to keep a record of any keyboard activity on your computer.

This includes usage in wordprocessor 5.5, Mathmatic, Norton Editor, KEYCOPY copies each keystroke to a buffer within the KEYCOPY program area. When the KEYCOPY buffer has 2000 keystrokes in memory, KEYCOPY will copy the buffer to a file with a date and time stamp. The file default is C:\KEYCOPY. You can specify the directory, subdirectory, and file name by leaving the parameter file called KO.PRM in the subdirectory where KEYCOPY is installed. If you change the KO.PRM file you must make the change to also agree with KEYCOPY, or computer will have to be rebooted, and KEYCOPY executed again. KEYCOPY has been tested and used with DOS 3.3 and 4.0 and uses less than 3% of memory.

There exists one problem with each of these programs, and that is that when the buffer fills and the TSR or shell writes the keystrokes to disk, the drive light will come on for seemingly no reason. This can be remedied by leaving the option, readwrite, and close interrupts for the non-parameters. Every time one of the file events occur, check the keyboard buffer to see if there is data to be written, and write it. This way, the activities are masked by other "normal" or expected drive activities. The only problem this poses is if the keyboard buffer fills and there are no drive activities. This is not a hard problem to solve, as often activity is frequent for most programs and unless the program is writing a novel without an auto-save feature, very little memory needs to be stored. One must also ensure that the information is saved. It would be a good implementation to open, write, and close every time a drive access occurs... there have been applications that when someone turned off the computer without saving the program and the entire capture was lost (such as a time I remember when a system had lagged into the BIOS memory).

Chris Boyes's KEYCOPY can be acquired for \$25 on 3.5" or 5.25" disk by writing to Chris Boyes, Box 7921, Hollywood, FL 33061. DEPL and its C sources could be available for distribution and modification. It can be found

on some FTP boards if you're stuck where it has propagated (0), and I was informed that it is available on the Hawaii's University CD-ROM. I do not know if that contains the executable only or if the source is also available.

I am presently too busy to make any further versions of DEPL, but if anyone wishes to make new versions and distribute them, they are welcome to... the trick is to give power to the victims of this world.

About a year and a half ago a friend of mine asked me if I'd like to help law enforcement by using my DEPL program. When I inquired about why they were interested in it, I was informed that they wanted to watch an individual who was suspected of involvement in the SOG scandal. After stating the importance of helping to get all sources involved in something that big, I gladly declined to help. So as one can see, the users are far-reaching and it is not just an issue of some type of nuclear weapon in a plot to destroy the world... its significance depends on the threat of the user. As the programmer, I am getting more than a headache, I have no control over the fact people who want to use it for harm, and another does the person who makes a Number.

The mere concept of DEPL has frightened many. I was effectively kicked out of a four year school for simply discussing the program I had written in Internet mail. As a computer science major using UNIX and VAX computers to do my school work, the administrator who was reading my e-mail took it upon himself to shut down my accounts. I was unable to go school work and therefore received Fs in my classes. Even when I wrote to the president of the school, I still got stalled. I was informed that it was illegal for the administrator to read my mail, but I heard these were really nothing I could do. Three years have passed and I just now received an associates degree from a junior college. My internet access is therefore limited to the systems I hack... an endeavor I find justifiable having been financially damaged by an ignorant security.

It is my advice to those seeking a college education to avoid attending four year schools in the Melbourne, Florida area. I would also advise you to obtain as much access to the public as possible. I know as the Internet will be many tools as possible (such as KEYSRV, KEYCOPY, and DEPL). With administrators such as the one I crossed paths with in power, the Internet will never see its rightful place with every person on the planet. No one owns the internet, but should they. People as I suspect have a right to use college libraries, yet internet access has been restricted. Fight for your rights or lose the growing power of the growing business... its your choice.

File's glossary

DP.EXE - Dream Pilot's Shell
DEPL.COM - Dr. Dalem's Shell
INSTALL.EXE - Program to install the shell
SCHARP.EXE - Program to scrape up captures from
DEKODER.EXE - Program to decode captures

GAMET.EXE - Program 1 to cover up what you're doing
GAMER.EXE - Program 2 to cover up what you're doing
INFO.BIN - Text configuration file

What is DEPL?
DEPL is the most sophisticated yet simple to use method of grabbing passwords, reading private messages, and finding out how others do things just you wouldn't know how to do.
So how does it work?
To begin discussing how it works, we need to look at what each of the files are for.

DEPL.COM
DEPL.COM is the main program which all other levels account. DEPL.COM is a shell, and a shell being a program which runs another program from within itself. To start simple we'll give an example with DEPL's predecessor DP.EXE.

How DP.EXE Has Been Used
I want to set up passwords that my friend (let's call him) will be able to use with the TELIX shell program... so what I do is, when he's not around, rename the TELIX.EXE program to some other name, and rename DP.EXE to TELIX.EXE so when he/she runs what they think is TELIX, they are actually running the shell. Now how does TELIX get run? Whatever you named it has to be known to the shell. In the case of Dream Pilot's program, DP.EXE will always have to run a program called TRIP.EXE. This means you need to rename TELIX.EXE to TRIP.EXE.

The chain of events so far: Friend runs TELIX.EXE (really DP.EXE), then TELIX.EXE runs TRIP.EXE (really TELIX.EXE).
So what's going on now that we're running TRIP.EXE through TELIX.EXE? Every keystroke is being recorded. DP.EXE will create files named by date, containing all the keystrokes, stripped. The capture files are hidden in a directory called OVER.AVS.DOS within the DOS directory. The files are hidden, remember so what you need next is a debugger and a way to speak into your friend's computer to scrape up all the files so you can go back to your level and decode them to see what your friend has been typing.
With DEPL, I have covered the whole process in a couple of ways. For one, instead of having to speak into your friend's computer and ask being

How corporate leaks are detected

by Parly Check

Everyday in the news we see a new government or corporate scandal which has been leaked to the press. During this time, the corporate spooks are usually trying to figure out who has leaked the memo to the press in the first place. One practice has developed into an art.

The first step involves finding out who had access to the information inside the organization. A list of names is then compiled and those persons are targeted by the security team.

One method used by security personnel to stop documents from being passed around is to put them on restricted distribution lists. These are lists of names or positions that are authorized to view and/or access the document. If you aren't on the list, you don't get the document.

This has a dual effect: first, the document is restricted, making it harder for the opponent to get the document. Second, should the document be leaked to the media or opponents, security officers will have a ready made list of suspects to start their investigation from.

Once a leak has occurred, the investigation team will attempt to locate the source of the leak by using multiple techniques such as interrogation, background screening, motives,

etc. These are all beyond the scope of this document and should be looked up in other publications (ADM Technical Journals, etc.). I will deal here with setting up traps for the source to reveal itself and the possible countermeasures that may be used.

One method to find leakers in an organization is to set up other restricted distribution lists from the original list. In each case a segment of the original list will be used until all of the individuals are listed on different lists in a unique combination. Then each of the lists are fed back - forged documents that the leaker would want to leak - and then the source is found by cross-referencing the documents that are actually leaked with the distribution lists.

This method has its problems. It's time consuming because of the forgery which needs to be created and because of the lists required. Furthermore, the source will in most cases become suspicious when multiple lists are created and when "flood" starts appearing in above average quantities. Also, nothing guarantees that the source will leak all of the documents sent to it.

Another method used is the operation of "mouse-trap" documents tailor-made to catch the source. The original document is fed into a computer along with a thesaurus. The

computer then uses synonyms to replace some words in the document. Punctuation (placement of comma, etc.) is also altered as is the header style and the spaces between paragraphs. Using a combination of these techniques, a unique document is made for each person it is to be sent to, while keeping the essence of the message intact. Should the

source discuss the message with another person on the document's distribution list, suspicion is not aroused as the central idea remains the same. Then, the document is released to the individuals. Should the document be shown on television or published in the newspaper, the security officers will be able to determine who leaked the document. However, the media have caught on to this and some only quote part of the document. Next again, because of the working and punctuation, the source can be found. In some corporations and government entities, this process is automated top to bottom, a new version of the document created each time it is requested. Of course, this technique has its limits as the source can always steal a colleague's copy and leak that version of the document.

A possible countermeasure is the complete reversal of the process - use a thesaurus and again change the punctuation. In this manner, regardless of what was changed inside the document provided it is not shown in a picture, nothing can be traced back to the original copy.

The last technique is essentially a watered-down version of the above. Studies or documents are released in massive quantities to the individuals, but each with a small discrepancy (typo, figures off by \$54, wrong date, etc.). The information in the document is low-level while still being confidential. The theory, not always truthful, behind the technique is that someone willing to leak large quantities of low-level information will also be willing to leak high-level information. The process is repeated several times until a pattern can be isolated from an individual.

In conclusion, there are several techniques each with their strong points and weaknesses. The best possible solution to finding a leak within an organization is probably some hybrid of all of them.

Thursday, The 7th of April 1994
Document revision 1.0

Getting ready to fax us a secret document?
WAIT!
We have a new fax number,
(516) 474-2677
Who knows, it may even spell something

How corporate leaks are detected

by Parity Check

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